A forecaster provides a probabilistic prediction regarding the following day's state of nature. To examine the forecaster, an inspector employs calibration tests that compare the average prediction and the empirical frequency of pre-specified events. This paper shows that any mixed test can be manipulated in the sense that, independently of the state realizations, the difference between the average prediction and the past empirical frequency that corresponds to almost any test employed diminishes to zero. In other words, a forecaster has a prediction scheme that passes almost any test. In particular, a forecaster can pass all the tests in a countable set simultaneously. * I am grateful to Rann Smorodinsky, Sylvain Sorin and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
Introduction
Consider a sequential forecast which may vary with time and history. A calibration test (see Dawid (1982) , Foster and Vohra (1997) and Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999) ) compares the observed empirical frequency over a set of times with the average prediction, over the same set of times. Each test checks different events at different times. A forecasting scheme passes a calibration test at a sequence of state realizations if the gap between these two figures diminishes to zero. In other words, each test defines what is consistent with the observed facts differently. A forecast is consistent with the observed facts according to a given test if the empirical frequency of the events checked coincides asymptotically with the average prediction of these events. When the forecast and the true distribution (according to which the states are selected) are the same, the forecast passes any calibration test with probability one. A calibration test is, therefore, Type I-error free.
The calibration tests treated in the literature are pure: After any history it is known what specific event (for instance, "rain", "foggy") is being considered. Here, we introduce mixed calibration tests, where, after each history, a randomly chosen event is checked.
A mixed test checks whether the average prediction of these randomly chosen events is asymptotically equal to the frequency of their realizations. Like a deterministic test, a mixed calibration test is also Type I-error free.
The main result of this paper shows that there is no mixed calibration test which rejects any inaccurate forecast. That is, for any test of this kind, there exists a forecasting scheme which is always consistent with the realized events. A constructive method to produce this scheme is provided as well.
Another interpretation of the main result involves a forecaster and an inspector. The inspector randomly chooses a calibration test according to a known distribution. It is shown that a forecaster, without knowing anything regarding the way states are selected can pass almost every test chosen by the inspector, independently of the sequence of realizations. In other words, the forecaster has a forecasting method which is consistent with the observed facts in the meaning induced by almost all tests.
Instead of randomly choosing one test, as discussed previously, the inspector can employ a set of tests simultaneously. The main result implies that if the inspector employs countably many calibration tests, for instance all those computable by a Turing machine, a forecaster can, likewise, pass them all 1 simultaneously. It means that a consultant or a scientist (e.g., a weather forecaster) who knows the (countable) set of tests his model needs to pass, can manipulate. That is, no matter what the sequence of realizations is, his manipulative forecast will pass all the tests. Foster and Vohra (1997) , who were the first to introduce the subject of calibration into game theory, deal with a combined calibration test. The forecast passes a combined test if over those times, where the forecaster says that the next state will be ω with probability p, the asymptotic empirical frequency of ω is indeed p. Foster and Vohra showed that there always exists a forecast that is consistent with the observed realizations in the sense that it passes the combined test for every sequence of state-realizations. Fudenberg and Levine (1999a) proved this result by the minmax theorem. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) did the same using Blackwell's approachability theorem (Blackwell (1956) , Foster and Vohra (1999) ).
The proof of the main result relies on an extension of Blackwell's approachability theorem (Blackwell (1956) ) to games with payoffs in infinite dimensional spaces (Lehrer (1997) ).
Forecasts and Checking Rules
Let Ω be a finite state space. At time n an outcome ω n ∈ Ω is realized. For each infinite stream of outcomes,
the history of length n, where ω 0 denotes the null history. At any time a probabilistic forecaster, after observing the past history ω n , assigns the distribution µ(·|ω n ) to the possible events in the subsequent period, n + 1. Formally, µ(·|ω n ) is a probability over Ω.
Remark 1.
By the Kolmogorov extension theorem (see Shiryayev (1984) ) the set of all probabilities µ(·|ω n ) induces a unique distribution, µ, over Ω ∞ . For any subset A of Ω, µ(A|ω n ) can be therefore interpreted as the conditional probability assigned by µ,
given ω n , that ω n+1 will be in A.
Definition.
A checking rule is a pair, D = (C, U ), where C and U are functions defined on the set of all histories, ∪ ∞ n=0 Ω n , with Ω 0 being a singleton. For every history ω n , C(ω n )
and U (ω n ) are events (i.e., measurable subsets) in Ω. Moreover,
The checking rule D is interpreted as follows. After the history ω n , D determines what (local) "universe" to consider (i.e., U (ω n )) and, within this "universe", which event to check (i.e., C(ω n )).
To empirically test the reliability of a forecast, Dawid (1982) introduced the notion of calibration. A belief is declared as being calibrated with the truth if observed frequencies of events match their forecasted probabilities. The checking rule D is used to empirically test the reliability of µ. This is done by comparing the relative frequency of the C's among the realizations of U to the conditional probability (according to µ) of C given U .
Relatedly, Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999) considered a special kind of checking rules, where U (ω n ) is either Ω or ∅.
For any checking rule define,
n is equal to 1 if the realized state is in the "universe" checked. In this case,
T n is the number of times, up to stage n, when the checking rule was active.
For any checking rule D, a forecast µ, and ω ∞ , denote,
where 0/0 is defined as 0 and ω 0 denotes the null history.
Remark 2. Conditional on ω t−1 , the expectation, with respect to µ, of the t-th sum-
, is zero.
Therefore, by the strong law of large numbers, f n (D, ω n , µ) converges to zero µ-almost surely.
Remark 3.
In case I t = 0, the t-th summand of (1) is equal to zero. That is, when
Remark 4. An alternative definition of f n (D, ω n , µ) can be given using the terminology of conditional expectation 2 . Let F t be the field generated by the histories of length t. Define two random variables C t and U t , both being F t -measurable, which take only two values, 0 or 1. C t = 1 only if ω t ∈ C(ω t−1 ) and U t = 1 only if ω t ∈ U (ω t−1 ). In other words, C t and U t are the characteristic functions of C(ω t−1 ) and U (ω t−1 ), respectively.
Ut
. Since C t = 1 implies U t = 1, the right side of this equality can also be written as
Ut . Dawid (1982) and Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999) ). Stated differently, the calibration tests are Type I-error free.
Definition. The forecast µ passes the calibration test induced by
The combined calibration test introduced by Foster and Vohra (1997) is not Type
is the number of times, up to time n, that the forecast is p.
be the fraction of those times for which the realization is ω ∈ Ω. Formally,
for every ω ∈ Ω, where the summation is taken over all the distributions, p.
Consider a forecasting scheme that satisfies the following two properties: (a) at any time, the forecast along the sequence of realizations ω ∞ differs from all previous forecasts, and (b) at any time, the probability assigned to each ω ∈ Ω is bounded away from zero.
Such a forecasting scheme does not pass the combined calibration test at ω ∞ . This is so because up to any time n, there are n different p's for which N (p, ω n ) = 1 and, moreover,
| is bounded away from zero. Note that the forecast does not pass the combined calibration test even if it is true, namely, even if the sequence of realizations is randomly chosen according to the forecasting scheme.
Thus, the combined calibration test is not Type I-error free.
The Main Result
Denote by D the set of all checking rules. This set is naturally endowed with a
topology (an open set includes all the rules that agree on a finite set of histories), and a σ-algebra (the algebra generated by all the open sets).
Suppose that the inspector chooses a checking rule out of D according to the distribution λ. The distribution λ will be referred to also as a mixed checking rule. Proof of Corollary 1. Let D be a countable set of checking rules and let λ be a distribution which assigns to any D ∈ D a positive probability. Since, by Theorem 1,
The proof of the main theorem, Theorem 1, requires some results regarding the approachability of random variables. These results are of interest in themselves, and are presented in the following sections.
The Game Played by the Forecaster and the Inspector
Fix ω ∞ ∈ Ω ∞ and consider the following sequential game. At time n, after the history ω n−1 of states, the forecaster chooses a distribution µ(·|ω n−1 ) over Ω and the inspector chooses a pair (
In other words, the forecaster's strategy is a complete forecasting scheme, µ, and the inspector's pure strategy is a checking rule, D. The forecaster wins the game if µ passes the calibration test induced by D at ω ∞ , and looses otherwise. We then say that
is equal to 1 if the forecaster wins and equal to 0 otherwise. Denote this game by Γ ω ∞ .
Note that in Γ ω ∞ , both players cannot condition their strategies on the previous choices made by their opponents. In subsection 10.1, we refer to the game where the inspector can condition his choices on the previous forecaster's predictions and claim that the same results hold. In any case, the forecaster may rely solely on previously realized states.
Returning to this game, the inspector is allowed to randomly choose a pure strategy.
Let λ be an inspector's mixed strategy. Thus, λ is a distribution over D. We now extend the range of U ω ∞ to accommodate also the inspector's mixed strategies as follows:
Since the players are not informed of ω ∞ before the game starts, the players actually play an unknown game selected from the set {Γ ω ∞ } ω ∞ ∈Ω ∞ . This is an incomplete information game without a prior distribution over the set of possible games. Non-Bayesian games of this kind were previously treated also in Banõs (1968) and in Megiddo (1980) .
The following rephrases Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 * . Given an inspector's mixed strategy λ, there is a forecasting scheme µ
The fact that the forecaster can win the game for any ω ∞ means that whatever the true distribution over Ω ∞ may be, say, π, the following holds:
Thus, if the strategy of the inspector is known, the forecaster has a strategy that ensures him a win without knowing the true distribution that governs the evolution of states.
The Principle of Approachability
This section is devoted to the geometric principle behind the proof. The simplest version of this principle called the principle of approachability, is the following. Let
.. be a uniformly bounded sequence in IR k . Denote by f n the average of the n first elements in the sequence. If for any n the inner product of f n and g n+1 , denoted f n , g n+1 , is less than or equal to zero, then the sequence of the averages, f n , converge to zero. That is, if for any n the element g n+1 and f n lie on two sides of the hyperspace perpendicular to f n , then the latter approaches zero. In a sense, by lying on the other side of the hyperspace perpendicular to f n , the vector g n+1 corrects the cumulative error at time n.
We proceed next to the first extension. Suppose that at any time there is also an activeness vector I n ∈ IR k whose coordinates are either 0 or 1. Define
, where the product (resp. quotient) of two vectors is the vector whose coordinates are the product (resp. quotient) of the corresponding coordinates. The i-th coordinate of f n is the average of the i-th coordinates of
.., g n when these are active.
An example.
Suppose that g 1 = (1, −3), g 2 = (7, 5), g 3 = (−2, 9), I 1 = (1, 1), I 2 = (1, 0) and I 3 = (1, 1). Then, T 3 = (3, 2) and f 3 = (2, 3).
Note that in case all the coordinates are always active (that is, I n is a vector of 1's for every n), then T n is a vector of n's and f n is, as before, the ordinary average.
An extension of the principle of approachability to this case is the following. Suppose that all the coordinates of T n go to infinity. If for any n the inner product of
, is less than or equal to zero, then f n converges to zero. Note that when, as in the previous case, T n+1 is constant, then f n , In case the inspector employs more than a finite number of tests, one needs a further extension of the principle of approachability. Let g 1 , g 2 , ... be a sequence of random variables whose variance is finite. These random variables are measurable functions from a probability space to the set of the real numbers. Denote by λ the underlining probability. The vectors in the previous case can be thought of as functions defined over a finite set consisting of k points. Here, the coordinates of the finite vectors are replaced by the points in the probability space. Let I n be a random variable which attains either 0 or 1 as values and let T n = n t=1 I t . As before, I n is the activeness random variable while T n counts the number of active times that correspond to every point in the probability
, where the product (resp. quotient) refers to the pointwise product (resp. quotient) of two random variables. The value of f n at a certain point is the average of the values that g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n take at the same point, over the active times.
Note that the expectation of the product of two random variables can serve as an inner product in the space of random variables whose variance is finite. The principle of approachability then takes the following form. If T n goes to infinity and if, in addition, for any n the expectation of the product of f n and
), is less than or equal to zero, then f n converges to zero. In symbols, if
then f n converges to zero. The convergence here is in the "almost surely" sense. That is, f n → 0 with λ-probability 1.
This principle is summarized by Proposition 1 in Lehrer (1997) .
is a sequence of non decreasing random variables that assume integer values.
is a sequence of random variables that take values in
; and
Then, f n converges to zero with λ-probability 1.
An Illustration of the Manipulative Forecast
Since non-Bayesian games are hard to handle, we consider a different game where the players are the forecaster and nature. As before, the forecaster provides a prediction while nature chooses a realization. The payoffs at any round are not numbers but functions defined over the set of pure tests. For any of the players' actions the value of the functionpayoff that corresponds to a test is the gap between the forecaster's prediction (of an event determined by the test) and nature's choice (1 for the case where nature's choice is in this event and 0 otherwise.) It is shown that the forecaster has a strategy that ensures that the partial average payoffs converge to zero with probability 1. In other words, the gaps between the relative frequency and the realizations that correspond to almost all tests converge to zero.
To illustrate the game and the strategy of the forecaster (his manipulative forecast), 
3 For an example with C strictly in U = Ω, we need more than two states.
The forecast at the second stage depends on the tests employed, which depend on 
If the realization on the second stage is ω 2 , then ω 2 = (a, ω 2 ) and f
, (see (1)). For instance, if the realization on the second stage is
Since ω 2 is not in U 2 (ω 1 ), the second test, D 2 , is inactive on the second stage and, hence, Considered as a zero-sum game, the matrix G has 0 as a value. Thus, the column player has an optimal strategy that ensures that the payoff will not exceed 0. This strategy, ( prove that all four tests are passed.
Consider now the matrix
G = 4 i=1 1 4 f 1 (D i ,ω 1 ,µ) 2 G D i .
The Proof of the Existence of a Manipulative Forecast
Proof of Theorem 1.
For a given D and ω n one may consider G (D,ω n ) (ω , ω ) as a zero-sum game, where player 1 chooses ω ∈ Ω and player 2 chooses ω ∈ Ω. Since
is a zero-sum game whose matrix is anti-symmetric. As such, its value is 0.
One may think of the forecaster as the column player and of nature, which chooses the realization, as the row player. A forecaster's prediction at time n + 1, µ(·|ω n ), is a distribution over the columns. In other words, for a given D, the forecaster's prediction is the column player's mixed strategy in G (D,ω n ) . Nature's choice at time n + 1 is a row, ω n+1 . In case the forecaster predicts µ(·|ω n ) and nature chooses ω n+1 , the expected
This term represents the n + 1 summand in the numerator of (1). Note that by Remark 3, whenever I n+1 (D, ω n+1 ) = 0, that is, whenever the checking rule D is inactive,
is the average payoff, over the times when D was active, of the expected payoffs in the games
.
The forecaster and nature are, then, engaged in a sequential game. At round n + 1 they take actions (the forecaster takes a mixed action, a prediction, and nature takes a pure action, a realization) and receive payoffs from many zero-sum games (
. The problem arising is how to manage many games played simultaneously and to arrive at f n+1 (D, ω n+1 , µ) converging to zero for λ-almost all D. The key idea is to combine all the games played into one game and then to play in the game obtained, optimally.
Let h be a bounded random variable over D. Consider the game
where the forecaster chooses a mixture over the columns, ω , and nature chooses a realization, a row ω . The game G h ω n is a linear combination of the games G (D,ω n ) .
Since each one of the games G (D,ω n ) has an anti-symmetric matrix, so does the game G h ω n . Therefore, the column player can guarantee a payoff that does not exceed zero. In other words, there exists a distribution, call it µ h (·|ω n ), over the columns of the matrix G h ω n such that for every row, ω , the expected payoff,
, is less than or equal to zero. That is,
Rearranging the terms, we obtain that when the realization ω is ω n+1 ,
Recall that I n+1 (D, ω n+1 ) indicates whether the checking rule D is active or not at time n + 1 and that T n+1 (D, ω n+1 ) counts the number of active times up to n + 1. Both figures depend not only on ω n but also on ω n+1 , the realization at time n + 1. However, the forecaster is unaware of this realization, and he may rely only on the information available to him, ω n , before providing the prediction at time n + 1.
. Now we are ready for the key step of the proof: defining the forecast at time n + 1. By (5) and by the definition of h, one obtains,
in the sense described in Section 5. (6) and (7) imply that
Let ω ∞ be the sequence of realized states, and let µ be the forecast just defined. We complete the proof by applying Proposition 1 to the random variables One may also conceive of the game played by the forecaster and nature as a game with payoffs in the space of random variables over D. At stage n + 1, the one-shot payoff is the random variable g n+1 (·, ω n+1 , µ) and the average payoff is f n+1 (·, ω n+1 , µ).
It turns out that for any specific checking rule and at any period of time, the payoffs are obtained from an anti-symmetric game. Since any linear combination of antisymmetric games is also anti-symmetric, the combined game, G h ω n , is also anti-symmetric. The value of an anti-symmetric game is zero; therefore, the column player, the forecaster, can guarantee that the stage-payoff will not exceed zero no matter what state nature may choose. This is why (7) can be guaranteed. a probability that is equal to the number of times ω appeared in the sample up to time
In other words, the forecast µ is F -good if, over the sample determined by F , the gap 7 between the empirical frequency and the average prediction tends to zero. Fudenberg and Levine (1999b) Proof: Apply Corollary 1 to the following countable set of checking rules. For every sampling rule F , and for every ω ∈ Ω, consider the checking rule defined as U (ω n−1 ) = Ω and C(ω n−1 ) = {ω} whenever F (ω n−1 ) = 1 and
Verbally, the checking rule corresponding to F and ω is the one that checks the singleton {ω} whenever the observation is to be sampled according to F and is inactive otherwise.
Concluding Remarks and Open Problems

Checking Rules that Depend on Previous Predictions.
The checking rules defined above are, at any time, functions of the history of realizations. One may extend the checking rules so that the events checked may depend in addition also on all historical predictions. It turns out that Theorem 1 remains correct when applied to such extended checking rules.
The key step of the proof in Section 7 is to find the function h that depends only on past information, ω n , and based on that function to define µ(·|ω n ) = µ h (·|ω n ). As long as the checking rules, whether deterministic or not, depend solely on past information (i.e., whether the rules depend on past realizations or on past predictions), one may define a function h that depends on the history alone. This enables one to define µ(·|ω n )
as before.
This means that Theorem 1 * remains true, even if the inspector is allowed to condition his choice on past predictions.
7 Note that this time, the gap is between distributions over Ω.
result tells us that when the inspector uses only past information, the forecaster can manipulate. The checking rules we dealt with are not forecast based and the proof of Section 7 cannot be applied to such checking rules. Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Vohra (1999) showed that checking rules that may depend on the stage prediction are manipulable as well. The forecasting scheme provided in Section 7 is such that after every history, the forecaster chooses deterministically one prediction. In contrast, the forecasting scheme of Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Vohra (1999) chooses a prediction randomly out of a finite set of possible predictions. 
